## Off Case

### 1nc – k

**We have reached the end of art and history – the patriarchal capitalist regime no longer relies on capital as production of material or extraction of labor but rather affective fuel – the 1ac is just the *new normal* of capital**

James 14 (Robin James, Associate Professor of Philosophy at UNC Charlotte, Incandescence, Melancholy, and Feminist Bad Vibes: A Response to Ziarek’s Feminist Aesthetics and the Politics of Modernism, differences:A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies, Vol. 25, No.. 2, p. 120-123, Duke University Press)

To use Jack Halberstam’s term, we like our women to “go gaga” because this incandescence, this “unpredictable feminine” (114) methodology allows us to eke even more light out of otherwise exhausted enlightenment modernity. If we’ve reached, as Ziarek discusses, the so-called end of art and the end of history (and the end of tonality and the end of representation and, well, the end of modernity), then the only way to find more resources is, like Pixar’s wall-e, by sifting through our vast piles of waste. And in that waste heap is abject femininity (what musicologist Susan Cook calls the feminized “abject popular”). Femininity is abject because its exclusion from patriarchy is what constitutes patriarchy as a coherent system. In both Ziarek’s aesthetics of potentiality and in resilience discourse, women artists do the cultural work of remaking abjection or constitutive exclusion into ecstatic radiance.13 In the former case, that work is revolutionary; in the latter case, that work normalizes. Resilience discourse transposes feminist revolution into a nationalist, patriarchal, white supremacist practice. Take, for example, Katy Perry’s “Firework,” in which the lyrics trace the affective journey from dejection to radiant exceptionality. The song begins by asking listeners to identify with feelings of irrelevance, weakness, loneliness, and hopelessness; it posits and affirms damage, suffering, and pain. But then Perry’s narrator argues that in spite and perhaps because of this damage, the listener has precisely the means to connect to others, to make a difference, to have hope: “[T]here’s a spark in you / You just gotta ignite the light and let it shine.” She uses the metaphor of fireworks (and their association with u.s. Independence Day celebrations) to describe the listener’s self-transformation from black dust to shining light: you may feel like trash, but if you can just light yourself on fire, that trash will burn with a dazzling radiance that lights up the sky, just as it lights up audiences’ faces. Here, Perry transforms abjection—feeling like trash, unmoored, socially dead—into incandescent triumph. In the song, the addressee’s personal triumph evokes u.s. nationalist narratives of overcoming colonization (i.e., the Declaration of Independence, celebrated on the Fourth of July). Feminine incandescence—the transformation of waste and melancholy into glowing potential—is no longer revolutionary. Not only parallel to u.s. nationalism, it is the very means for reproducing normativity. In resilience discourse, wild and crazy femmes—like, say, Ke$ha— reproduce normativity in the same way that deregulatory economic practices do (see Cardenas). Unlike Kant’s genius, who gives laws and generates order (i.e., regulation, giving a law) out of unruly materiality, the incandescent, “gaga” femme amplifies what feels like disorder by “resignif[ying] damaged bodies and objects previously expelled from the realm of meaning” (6). And to do this, incandescent femme geniuses use a specific type of experimentation, what Ziarek calls “a dynamic model of interrelation between literary form and material elements of the work of art” (6). This “dynamic interaction” between large-scale form and material details produces “effects” that are “unpredictable and unforeseeable” (Adorno qtd. in Ziarek 114). Experimental methods produce aleatory results.14 Neoliberalism, however, has systematized the aleatory; deregulatory practices are designed to control background conditions so that “dynamic interactions” between form and material produce a range of superficially random outcomes.15 Deregulation turns experimentation into the means of capitalist/hegemonic production. Brilliant gaga ecstasy is what fuels economic and social reproduction.16 So even though incandescent potentiality might be “the very opposite of the traffic in women” (Ziarek 119) figured as the exchange of commodities (e.g., in Irigaray and Rubin), it is quite consistent with neoliberal political and aesthetic economies. Who radiates with potentiality more than the resilient, entrepreneurial postfeminist woman? In the same way that feminized, blackened receptivity was the solution to modernist anxieties about alienation (e.g., the aforementioned Gooding-Williams), feminized, racially nonwhite resilience is taken as a solution to the problem of the “end of art.” Having transgressed all limits and prohibitions—for example, emancipating dissonance, making music out of noise—modernist art had no means of establishing its opposition to society/social normativity. Similarly, capitalism had colonized the globe, exhausting its ability to profit through simple expansion; with no new markets, with nothing else new to conquer, it needed a new method for generating surplus value. As Jeffery Nealon and others argue, capitalism has become a logic of investment and intensity. Instead of expanding and assimilating, it recycles waste and increases efficiencies. Thus, traditionally non- or devalued “women’s work” becomes the fastest growing sector of the service-and-care-work economy. And women’s art-making practices become the hottest new thing in the artworld: think of all the “feminist art” retrospectives and exhibits that have taken place in the past five or so years. Modernism’s constitutive outside becomes neoliberalism’s bread and butter; or, the abject is now central to the means of capital, political, and aesthetic production.17

#### Screw your activism vote for us because we are the best at it. As Squid once said— “our expansion of core antitrust law, our prohibition of anticompetitive business practices, becomes only another form of capital – we live in a control society, one where dialogue is incentivized but closely regulated as another way to gain information, capital – you move, you breathe, and it’s all carefully calculated – all pre-planned – this round? pre-planned – your speaks? pre-planned – long ago the calvinists uncovered the only capital t truth to have ever existed, that Jared and Alex were going to win this debate.”

Hoofd 07 (Ingrid M. Hoofd, National University of Singapore, “The Neoliberal Consolidation of Play and Speed: Ethical Issues in Serious Gaming” in “CRITICAL LITERACY: Theories and Practices Volume 1: 2, December 2007,” p. 6-14, 2007)

Serious games are a fascinating next stage in the continuous exploitation of digital media technologies over the last decades for training, learning, and education. As formal education and training always involves the transmission and repetition of certain culturally and socially specific sets of skills and moral values, it would be of paramount importance to ensure that developments within the serious gaming industry are in step with the effects of the good intentions of nurturing people within a social framework that emphasises a fair, culturally diverse, and blooming society. In this light, it is interesting that from the very advent of the information society, digital technologies have been depicted as central to the development of a more just and equal society by harbouring the promise of bridging gaps between classes, races, and genders locally as well as globally. Driven by the vision of this utopian potential of new technologies, the education industry and larger policy organisations have been exploring the pedagogical possibilities of these technologies both in- and outside the traditional classroom for the last twenty-five years. Indeed, the implementation of increasingly more sophisticated and technologically mediated methods and tools for learning and education, takes as its starting point the techno-utopian assumption that (new) interactive technologies themselves are the primary harbingers of a fair and blooming society through facilitating (student) empowerment. This paper takes issue with this widespread techno-utopian perspective by seeking to shed light on the larger ethical implications of serious gaming. It will do so through foregrounding the relationship between global injustices, and the aesthetic properties and discourses of serious gaming. So while reframing serious games themselves in a new ethical perspective constitutes the main objective of this paper, it is equally important to situate serious games within a larger political discourse on the teaching of new skills. Firstly then, policy papers and academic studies on serious games all display an assumption of the inherent neutrality of gaming technologies, as if these technologies were mere tools equally suitable for all. What also becomes apparent in the language used in these studies and proposals, is how this instrumentalist vision of gaming technologies for learning goes hand in hand with a particular neo-liberal assumption of what constitutes a fit individual, and by extension of what the hallmarks of a ‘healthy’ society may be. For instance, in the European Union study “Serious Gaming – a fundamental building block to drive the knowledge work society” by Manuel Oliveira on the merits of serious games for education, justification runs along the lines of gaming ‘encouraging risk-taking and a winning attitude’ and creating a ‘performance-oriented individual.’ Similarly, Michael Guerena from the US Orange County Department of Education proposes in one of the Department’s web-casts that serious games instil “twenty-first century skills” like risk-taking, adaptability, self-direction, interactive communication, and ‘planning and managing for results’ in the students through the “channelling of fun.” Likewise, the UK-based Entertainment and Leisure Software Publishers Association last year published their white paper Unlimited learning - Computer and video games in the learning landscape, in which they argue that serious games will “create an engaged, knowledgeable, critical and enthusiastic citizenry” whose “work practices will be geared towards networked communication and distributed collaboration” (49). Concerns around the ethical implications of serious games regarding their entanglements with larger social (gendered, classed, and raced) inequalities have until now largely been coined in terms of game content or representation. In a recent case in Singapore, the government’s proposition of using the RPG Granado Espada in secondary school history classes was followed by an outcry from various local academics condemning the stereotypical characters and simplistic representation of medieval Europe in the game. Likewise, various authors have critiqued current serious games not only because of simplistic representation of characters and surroundings, but especially because simulations generally tend to oversimplify complex social problems and situations. Gibson, Aldrich, and Prensky’s Games and Simulations in Online Learning (vi - xiv) for instance discuss these demerits of serious games. While such a critical analysis of how game content contributes to the reproduction of dominant discourses is definitely helpful, I would argue that the aesthetics of serious games involve much more than mere content. Instead, this paper will argue that the formal quest for instantaneity that research around digital media has displayed through the development of interactive technologies for education is already itself by no means a neutral affair. This is because the discourses that inform this quest and that accompany this search for instantaneity arguably enforce the hegemony of a militaristic, masculinist, humanist, and of what I will call a ‘speed-elitist’ individual. Moreover, I suggest that the propensity of current games to have sexist or racist content, is merely symptomatic of gaming technology’s larger problematic in terms of the aesthetic of instantaneity. In short, (serious) computer games have become archives of the discursive and actual violence carried out in the name of the utopia of technological progress and instantaneity under neo-liberal globalisation. This archival function is possible exactly because cybernetic technologies promise the containment and control of such supposedly accidental violence, while in fact exacerbating these forms of violence. This leads me to conclude that such violence is in fact structural to new serious gaming technologies, rather than accidental. I will elaborate this hypothesis by looking at various theorists who seek to understand this structural imperative of new technologies, and their relationship to the neo-liberalisation of learning and education. In turn, I will look at how this problematic structural logic informs the two popular serious games Real Lives and Global Warming Interactive. Secondly, the advent of serious gaming interestingly runs parallel with the contemporary dissemination and virtualisation of traditional learning institutions into cyberspace. While the existence of learning tools in other areas of society besides actual learning institutions has been a fact since the advent of schools, the shift of methods of learning into online and digital tools is symptomatic of the decentralisation of power from ‘old’ educational institutions and its usurpation into instantaneous neo-liberal modes of production. I am summarising the work of Bill Readings on the university here, because it sheds light on the shift in education tout court towards virtualisation, and its relationship to the ‘new hegemony of instantaneity.’ In The University in Ruins, Readings argues that the shift from the state-run university of reason and culture to the present-day global knowledge enterprise must mean that the centre of power in effect has shifted elsewhere. More important, says Readings, is that the function of the new ‘university of excellence,’ one that successfully transforms it into yet another trans-national corporation, relies on the fantasy that the university is still that transcendental university of culture in service of the state and its citizens. So the invocation of the fantasy of an ‘originary’ university of reason and progress, that produces unbiased knowledge for the good of all, facilitates the doubling of the production of information into other spaces outside the university walls proper. While Readings surely discusses only higher education institutions in The University in Ruins, I would argue that the logic of a shifting centre of power from the state into the technocratic networks and nodes of speed operates quite similarly in the case of primary, secondary, and other types of formal education. Indeed, the current virtualisation of learning and the emphasis on lifelong learning marks a dispersal of traditional learning institutions into online spaces. This dispersal works increasingly in service of the ‘speed-elite’ rather than simply in service of the nation-state. The heralding of serious games for education can therefore be read as a symptom of the intensified reach of the imperatives of neo-liberal globalisation, in which consumption enters the lives of locally bound as well as more mobile cosmopolitan citizens of all ages through harping on the technological possibility of the confusion of production and play. Through the imperative of play then, production increasingly and diffusely colonises all niche times and -spaces of neo-liberal society. In other words, (the emphasis on) play allows not only a potential increase in production and consumption through the citizen-consumer after her or his formal education of ‘skills’, but starkly intensifies flows of production and consumption already at the very moment of learning. While such an integration of play and production is generally understood within the framework of the neo-liberal demand for the circulation of pleasure, it is useful here to widen the scope from understanding the learner as a mere consumer of pleasure into the larger set of problematic interpellations that marks subjugation in contemporary society. Intriguingly, a host of research has emerged over the past years pointing towards the intricate relationship between subjugation, military research objectives, and videogame development. Such research suggests an intimate connection between the C3I logic and humanist militaristic utopias of transcendence, which incriminates interactive technologies as inherently favouring culturally particular notions of personhood. In the case of computer- and video-games for entertainment, researchers have argued that the aesthetic properties of gaming technologies give rise to so-called ‘militarised masculinity.’ In “Designing Militarized Masculinity,” Stephen Kline, Nick DyerWitheford, and Greig de Peuter argue for instance that interactive games open up very specific subject positions that “mobilize fantasies of instrumental domination” (255). This specific mobilisation that video-games invoke, is not only due to the remediation of violent television- and film- content, but also due to the intimate connection between gaming- and military industries which grant these technologies their particular cybernetic aesthetic properties (see also Herz 1997). This element of militarisation partly informs my concept of ‘speed-elitism.’ I extrapolate the idea of ‘speed-elitism’ largely from the works of John Armitage on the discursive and technocratic machinery underlying current neo-liberal capitalism. In “Dromoeconomics: Towards a Political Economy of Speed,” Armitage and Phil Graham suggest that due to the capitalist need for the production of excess, there is a strong relationship between the forces of exchange and production, and the logic of speed. In line with Virilio’s argument in Speed and Politics, they argue that various formerly the less connected social areas of war, communication, entertainment, and trade, are now intimately though obliquely connected. This is because all these forces mutually enforce one another through the technological usurpation and control of space (and territory), and through the compression and regulation of time. Eventually, Armitage and Graham suggest that “circulation has become an essential process of capitalism, an end in itself” (118) and therefore any form of cultural production increasingly finds itself tied-up in this logic. So neo-liberal capitalism is a system within which the most intimate and fundamental aspects of human social life – in particular, forms of communication and play – get to be formally subsumed under capital. In “Resisting the Neoliberal Discourse of Technology,” Armitage elaborates on this theme of circulation by pointing out that the current mode of late-capitalism relies on the continuous extension and validation of the infrastructure and the neutral or optimistic discourses of the new information technologies. Discourses that typically get repeated – like in the policy papers – in favour of the emerging speed-elite are those of connection, empowerment and progress, which often go hand in hand with the celebration of highly mediated spaces for action and communication. Such discourses however suppress the violent colonial and patriarchal history of those technological spaces and the subsequent unevenness brought about by and occurring within these spaces. I would claim that Armitage’s assessment of accelerated circulation, and the way new technologies make play complicit in the techno-utopian endeavour of speed, is crucial for understanding the larger ethical issues surrounding serious games. It is helpful at this point to look at Paul Virilio’s and Jacques Derrida’s work because this helps us understand the complicity of the aesthetics of interactive and visually oriented gaming technologies in speed-elitism. In “Cyberwar, God, and Television,” Paul Virilio talks about the simulation industry’s function of “exposing [one] to the accident in order not to be exposed to it” (322). What is according to him ‘accidented’ through the virtualisation of accidents and violence, for instance in video-games, is reality itself. This ‘accident of reality’ that virtuality brings about, argues Virilio, is due to the fact that simulation technologies fragment space through their property of instantaneous connection with previously far-away places. The hallmark of this fragmentation is therefore that it brings about an intensification of forms of in- and exclusion through actual disconnection. Eventually, there will be “two realities: the actual and the virtual” (323), and I would claim that consequently the privileged speed-elite will be able to live in the illusion of engaging with social reality that the virtual grants, at the cost of the (s)lower classes who will suffer the social and ecological effects of the accidents of virtualisation. The illusion of mastery for Virilio consists in the sense of the “incorporation of the world within oneself” that “real time technologies permit” (328) due to their militaristic compulsion that seeks to “reduce the world to the point where one could possess it” (329). I maintain that these statements spell out exactly the function and logic of serious gaming. Virilio elaborates the idea of the ‘museum of accidents’ later in his infamously apocalyptic “The Museum of Accidents.” His evaluation of certain visual simulation technologies as ‘museums of accidents’ and in particular in how these accidents involve the increasing stratification of individuals within a new global imperative of speed, resonates well with Jacques Derrida’s work on the ‘archiving’ properties of new technologies and their implications. In Monolingualism of the Other, or The Prosthesis of Origin, Derrida parallels the concept and the technique of memory and archiving with these new technologies. He argues that the tragedy of the disappearance of various cultures calls forward a desire in the R&D community – like teachers and developers of serious games – to prevent this from happening by using the immense possibilities of presentday archiving technologies. However, he cautions that this scientific quest to rescue through archiving languages and cultures from going extinct due to ongoing globalisation processes, once more presupposes that cultures and peoples are pre-given static entities, or simple identities, that can then be simply ‘stored’. Moreover, it falsely presupposes that archiving technologies are neutral tools, as well as that the ideology behind this archiving desire is a universal or neutral one. But since the very technicity of archiving is one that is already entangled with the same dominant culture that archives, the necessary translation or recognition of materials fit for archiving will have as its logical parameters this dominant culture. This kind of messianistic desire, as much as the quest for understanding the other (or rather, the claim that one does empathise with and understand the other), is therefore actually a violent, neocolonialist, and possessive sort of encapsulation. Similarly, the well-intended pedagogical aim to ‘salvage otherness’ from the tragedy of disappearance under globalisation works completely in accordance with that very tragedy. One could compare this well-intended encapsulation for instance with the anthropological display of artefacts of certain cultures in Western museums. It may be far more important to save actual humans than to salvage, understand, and store their perceived culture or language, and Derrida warns that the choice for one generally does not imply a choice for the other. This ‘virtual empathy’ that new simulation technologies endow, which sadly works in accordance with the ‘structural accident’ of disenfranchisement under neoliberal globalisation, is indeed present in the aesthetic of many serious games currently available. The widely praised and sympathetic game Real Lives is a good example of this. The pedagogical objective of Real Lives, as its website declares, is to “learn how people really live in other countries.” The producers maintain that Real Lives is an “empathy-building world” which will grant the students an “appreciation of their own culture and the cultures of other peoples.” The game opens with assigning a character who just got born at any place in the world to the player. Since the attribution of the character is based on actual statistical possibilities of place of birth and economic status, the character has a high propensity of being born poor in countries like India, Mexico, or in other highly populated places. During the course of the game, the player can take actions like deciding to go to school or staying home to help her/his parents, which hobbies to take up, what job to take, and so forth. The game time takes one-year leaps in which the player can see the outcome of outside events, like disease or floods, and of his or her own actions. The software shows a map of the character’s birth region and its statistics, like population density, gross annual income, currency, health standards, and etcetera. The character is also assigned traits, like happiness, athleticism, musicality, health, and so on. While the player’s actions definitely influence the health and economic status of the played character and her family, the potentially interesting part of the game lies in the fact that events and situations that are ostensibly beyond the player’s control influence the outcomes. Such a game structure potentially endows the student with a sense that simple meritocratic discourses are flawed. However, what is also obvious in Real Lives, is that the attribution based on statistical facts may very easily lead to a simplistic view of a country and its inhabitants. While India for instance surely has many poor people and girls often are not allowed to go to school, to have the student chance time and again on these representations can easily lead to the repetition of stereotypes and a failure to grasp the complexity of Indian society. More serious however is the formal technological mode of objectification and its distancing effects that the game generates. This objectification resides in how the ‘clean’ interface – the ‘flight simulator’ like visual layout on the screen with the overview of categories and character attributes, the major actions and events in the character’s life induced at the stroke of a few keys – in reality grants the player a sense of control by engaging with a machine programmed in such a way that it appears to let the student identify with and act out his or her empathy vis-à- vis a ‘real’ child in need. This discursive confusion of reality and virtuality is for instance also present in the web-game Darfur Is Dying, in which the player and virtual character get confused through the problematic claim that you can “start your experience (as a refugee)” and that it offers a “glimpse of what it is like” (emphases mine) to be a refugee. At the same time, the actual children in need on the ground disappear from the player’s radar, turning them into a distant and vague large group of ‘others’ who are effectively beyond the student’s reach of immediate responsibility. As Virilio suggests, the time spend through engaging in virtual empathy eclipses the ‘real accidents’ from the student’s view and experience. What is more, Real Lives eclipses the larger social and economical relationships between the material production and consumption of such virtual engagement and the continuous exploitation and ‘museumising’ of peoples on the brink of (social, economical, and environmental) accident, disenfranchisement, and even death. While relatively well-off youth may indulge in turning other peoples’ distress into a ‘fun’ educational game, such indulgence is precisely based on a neo-liberal structure that exploits the environment, especially of the poor, and allows for the outsourcing and feminisation of ever cheaper third-world labour. As Derrida proposed, the archiving into visual technologies of certain cultures and peoples threatened with extinction does not at all imply saving these actual people and their cultures – in fact, it may very well do exactly the opposite. Long-term minor attitudinal changes in the student notwithstanding, the disconnecting properties of the new cybernetic technologies of speed that Real Lives is part of therefore displace the effect of the producer’s and student’s good intentions and empathy into an instantaneous technocratic violence that effectively ‘plays with lives.’ Another telling example of this displacement of well-intended interactive play is the environmental game Global Warming Interactive – CO2Fx. This web-based game, funded by the United States National Science Foundation and developed by a group of people from various American consultancies and educational organisations, aims at teaching the student about the kinds of decision making involved in global warming. The game invariably starts with a map of the country of Brazil in the 1960s, and gives statistics about the carbon emission, air temperature, and general welfare of the population. The player can then control government budget expenditures for science, agriculture, social services, and development initiatives, after which the system jumps ten years into the future, generating results based on these expenditures. The game eventually ends by showing the relative increase in temperature in the virtual year of 2060, warning the player that more international cooperation is required to really tackle global warming. The major issue with Global Warming Interactive is once more that it completely obscures the relationship between the computing technology itself that allows the CO2Fx simulation, and global warming. A telling moment of this dissimulation is when the game urges the player to “switch off the television!” because television uses quite a bit of energy, while the energy consumption of the infrastructure, mode of production, student consumption, and tools that sustain the game itself is being blissfully ignored. Armitage’s claim that increasingly modes of thought, learning, and exchange are formally subsumed under capital through the new technological infrastructure certainly rings true here. The game is also a stark simplification of how government decisions affect a complex issue like climate change, and is fraught with problematic and often techno-utopian assumptions about how to tackle the climate change problem. A good example of this assumption is the recurring recommendation throughout the game to the player to spend more money on scientific research, as this expenditure supposedly promises to solve or alleviate the warming problem. The speed-elitist, humanist, and techno-utopian discourses that permeate American academia and consultancy firms are clearly reflected in Global Warming Interactive, leaving the student inculcated with a currently dominant belief system that lies precisely at the base of environmental pollution and economical disenfranchisement that urges certain groups of poor people in a country like Brazil to survive on environmentally unfriendly business solutions, like slash-burning the forests. One is also left to wonder why the game uses the country of Brazil in the first place, and not the United States – arguably the largest global polluter today. There is indeed a problematic (neo)colonialist undertone to the current one-country version of Global Warming Interactive. Extending the content of the game, as the developers seeks to do, by including more countries in the simulation, would not alleviate this problem, but would simply concur with the actual contemporary shift from previous colonialist social hierarchies into speed-elitist hierarchies. But more seriously, giving the player simulated government omnipotence through the Virilian ‘museumisation’ of the economical and social structures underlying global warming in that ‘other’ country of Brazil, grants a the player an illusion of mastering and of dealing constructively with the major ‘accident’ of climate change and its impact on the (s)lower classes while actually fuelling it. Meanwhile, player or student empathy is displaced into instantaneous networks of ever increasing neo-liberal circulation and production. Scholars like David Leonard in “’Live in your world, play in ours?’: Race, video games, and consuming the other” and Lisa Nakamura in “Race in/for Cyberspace” have in the past argued that many entertainment games contain elements of racial and gendered stereotyping allowing the gamer to engage him or herself on the basis of what Nakamura calls ‘identity tourism’ and Leonard calls ‘blackface.’ These problematic modes of (dis)identification allow the user not only to enter the game via dominant modes of representation, but also entail a form of ‘safely experiencing the other’ through cybernetic technologies, where the (imagined) other effectively becomes consumed through the high-tech prosthesis of the self. Neither Nakamura nor Leonard however elaborate how and why this element of a ‘safe prosthesis’ appears to be a central aesthetic of gaming technologies. After all, much media content suffers from stereotypical representation, and one could argue in line with Derrida’s Monolingualism of the Other that media are always prostheses to the self. I would argue that what is specific about serious gaming technologies that emerges from my interpretations of Derrida’s, Armitage’s, and Virilio’s assessments is the illusion of control by the self that these technologies facilitate, due to their element of interactive instantaneity. It is the new technologies’ aesthetic properties themselves – rather than simply a narrative and its repetition of dominant ideologies – that grant a ‘fantasy of connection, wholeness, and mastery’ through interactivity as if it was an immediate and transparent property of the gaming subject. What is therefore at work in serious games like Real Lives and Global Warming Interactive is a form of double objectification. The illusion of constructive engagement with a pressing social issue through these seemingly ‘clean’ and ‘neutral’ technologies, combined with the distancing effect brought about by these technologies from their actual (social and environmental) implications, make the gamer complicit in the neo-liberal endeavour that paradoxically precisely leads to contemporary speed-elitist disenfranchisement. In short, interactive technologies like serious games bring about a displacement of good intentions through claims of technological progress and empowerment for all. So despite (or perhaps because of) the good intentions of game designers and publishers, these games then in fact exhibit the doubling of the colonialist logic that inspired humanist narratives of progress. This doubling runs parallel to the virtualisation of learning that is taking place under neo-liberal globalisation and its speed-elitist modes of intensified in- and exclusion this shift incurs. These games can therefore, in line with Virilio’s argument, be understood as attempts at (eventually unsuccessfully) containing the accident of the real and its social repercussions brought about by these technologies of speed. To conclude, the development of serious games is implicated in what Derrida in Monolingualism refers to as a ‘disappearance’ of those cultures, idioms, and ways of being that do not conform to these tightening particular hegemonic structures of acceleration. ‘Healthy’ personhood becomes singularly understood through a restrictive and stratifying emphasis on mediated learning as more pleasurable, as well as on humanistic character traits like creativity, activity, risktaking, mediated empathy, mobility, and competitiveness, as the rhetoric in policy papers and optimistic studies also shows. Such particular valorisations are problematic because they recreate a meritocratic, masculinist, militaristic, and speed-elitist hierarchy between economically as well as otherwise diverse groups and communities within a global community which understands individuals solely in terms of active and productive citizenship. In line with this, serious games themselves can in their very form be understood as Virilian ‘museums of accident.’ This means that the virtualisation of social engagement and sense of social and environmental ‘accident control’ that these games call forward is obliquely yet intrinsically related to new modes of ‘accidenting’ material reality. This potentially disenfranchises those who are not (positively) addressed within these properties of subject-formation, and leads to increasing levels of stress and competitiveness in individuals and students as it becomes progressively more imperative for individual survival to conform to the demands of the speed-elite. Without doubt, this paper has analysed only a few serious games currently available and surely more analyses need to be conducted. I suggest nonetheless that since the problematic of speed, which gives rise to double objectification, is structurally present in all visual interactive technologies, it is by default at work in all serious games. As I suggested at the start, the pedagogical and ethical enterprise of serious gaming is therefore serious indeed, as its aesthetic properties become increasingly implicated in precisely the opposite of what serious gaming promises to help make possible – the fair, culturally diverse, and blooming society that we all want.

#### The speech act of the 1ac is just shilling for the speed-elite – the push to make debate a site of activism and circulate knowledge about antitrust and disability mystifies their reliance on unethical modes of technology and communication that results in expansions of militaristic violence – instead you should vote negative in favor of the 1nc’s poetic, speculative research method that takes problem in visibility through rendering it visible – this is an ethics of intellectual inquiry that resists the imperative of speeding up the flow of information and instead performs the trick of fatal theory, engendering an accident in the infrastructure that brings about the possibility of the event. Our refusal of the affirmative’s will to knowledge beyond the point of speculation clones the form of debate, causing the university to implode from within

**Hoofd 10** (Ingrid M. Hoofd, Assistant Professor in the Communications and New Media Programme at the National University of Singapore, Feb 2010, “The accelerated university: Activist-academic alliances and simulation of thought,” ephemera, http://www.ephemerajournal.org/contribution/accelerated-university-activist-academic-alliances-and-simulation-thought)

Although Facoltà di Fuga and Ricercatori Precari do not ally themselves explicitly with the alter-globalist movement, their call against neo-liberalism and for online thinking and research in service of the struggles of ‘the oppressed and marginalised’ makes them quite suitable for creating such alliances. This call for ‘knowledge in service of the oppressed’ is more explicitly present in Investigacció (Research), which was set up in order to combine the agendas of social movement activists with those of university researchers. In their flyer for their first international meeting on ‘Social Movements and Activist Research’ in 2004 in Spain, Investigacció likewise aptly accuses the neo-liberal privatisation of knowledge as the main cause for current social exclusion. Knowledge, in their view, instead should be produced from the ‘focal point of activist research’ which should entail the ‘actual subjectivities of research from and for social movements’, instead of from those who reside within the privileged space of academia (Investigacció, 2005: 1). The meeting is hopefully envisioned to be a ‘space of encounter and self-formation’ which ‘self-constitute[s] as a-disciplinary so that we can overcome the fictitious distinctions common to academicism’ (2005: 2). Knowledge will thus, according to Investigacció, be generated ‘from our own subjectivities (in contrast to aiming for scientific ‘objectivity’) without limitations or hierarchies’ (2005: 3). But far from an ‘a-disciplinary self-constitution’ that supposedly overcomes any fictitious distinction, Investigacció for one relies heavily on the common fictitious distinction between activism and academia to validate their praxis. By contrasting their initiative to the false objectivity of academicism, they **validate their own knowledge production** by **claiming to be in the margins** as opposed to **the ‘ivory tower’**, as if the latter is a stable area from which one can detach oneself from the outside world and hence **objectively analyse**. Also, **one could wonder to what extent one is actually speaking from the margins when one has the time, technologies, spaces and connections to organise an event** like Investigacció. The desire to generate knowledge from **‘one’s own subjectivity, without limitations’** (2005: 3**) is analogous to the mythical humanist narrative of breaking with and improving upon previous knowledge – a form of knowledge-innovation that the academic institution is also infused with.** The university of excellence as well as its doublings into projects like Investigacció are therefore an effect of its repetitions (with a difference) into the neo-liberal mythical space of progress and acceleration. The creation of more and more ‘spaces and mechanisms of production, exchange and collective reflection’ (2005: 3) is indeed precisely what late-capitalism seeks to forge, as long as such reflection generates an intensification of production. **The idea that subjectivities from social movements are in any way less produced by neo-liberal globalisation is highly problematic**. In fact, such an idea suggests a **rather positivist notion of the subject** – similar to that supposedly objective academic individual Investigacció seeks to dethrone. Investigacció then somewhat nostalgically narrates a subject untainted by power structures and technologies. In fact, the Investigaccióinitiative displays how the subject of activist research empowers her- or himself throughrecreating the fictitious distinction between activism and academia. S/he does so by reproducing this opposition, which in turn co-creates and accelerates these ‘new spaces’ – spaces that were created with the goal of facilitating global capitalism and its speed-elite, and that allow for the perfection of military power through technologies of surveillance. The call for participants to become active and productive in co-organising the international event – of course, without any monetary remuneration – is also much present in Investigacció’s rhetoric. They suggest that participants should engage with one another not only at the meeting, but especially through the online spaces Investigacció has created for the purpose of generating **activist research**. ‘**Take action!’ says their flyer**, ‘[...] **make it so the conference is yours**!’ This seductive appeal to the subject-individual as the centre of creative production is very common to neo-liberal consumerism and its emphasis on cybernetic interactivity. But it is also false in that it gives the participants a sense of control over Investigacció that they actually do not have – eventually, the main organisers (have already) set the agenda and handed out the stakes. In short, the organisers fail to situate themselves by pretending everyone is on the same level of privilege – for example, not requiring monetary compensation – in this project, and this failure is strangely an effect of their attempt at reviving a more democratic academic structure. Information Initially, one could think that Baudrillard’s assessment **confirms my analytical suspicion regarding activist-research projects**. In ‘The Implosion’, Baudrillard starts from the premise that the **increase of information** in our media-saturated society **results in a loss of meaning** because it ‘**exhausts itself** in the act of **staging communication’**. New media technologies **exacerbate the subject’s fantasy of transparent communication**, while increasingly what are communicated are mere copies of the same, a ‘recycling in the negative of the traditional institution’ (Baudrillard, 1994: 80). New technologies are simply the **materialisation of that fantasy of communication**, and the ‘**lure’** (1994: 81) of such a **technocratic system** resides in the requirement of **active political engagement to uphold that fantasy**. **This translates in a call to subjectivise oneself** – **to be vocal, participate, and to ‘play the [...] liberating claim of subjecthood’** (1994: 85). The result of the intensifying circular logic of this system, he says, is that meaning not only implodes in the media, but also that **the social implodes in the masses** – the construction of a ‘hyperreal’ (1994: 81). Contra the claim of Glocal Research Space that such praxes of alliance are ‘without an object’ (Glocal Research Space, 2003: 19), this does not mean that objectification does not take place at all. Instead, and in line with Baudrillard’s argument, the urge to subjectivise oneself and the objectification of the individual go hand in hand under speed-elitism – a double bind that locks the individual firmly into her or his technocratic conditions. Indeed, the argument in ‘Activist Research’ that ‘research [should be] like an effective procedure [which is] in itself already a result’ (2003: 19) describes the conditions of Readings’ ‘university of excellence’ where any research activity, thanks to technological instantaneity, translates immediately into the capitalist result of increased information flow (Readings, 1996: 22). **Active subjects and their others become the cybernetic objects of such a system of information flow**. The insistence in ‘Activist Research’ on free, travelling and nomadic research simply makes sure that this logic of increased flow is repeated. Because of this desire for increased flow and connection, **activist-research projects are paradoxically highly exclusivist in advocating the discourses and tools of the speed-elite**. The problem with projects like Edu-Factory or the **productive cross-over of activism and academia** is therefore not only that **their political counter-information means just more information** (**and loss of meaning**) **as well as more capitalist production**, but that **it puts its faith in precisely those technologies and fantasies of control, communication and of ‘being political’ that underlie the current logic of overproduction.** It is at this point that John Armitage and Joanne Roberts in ‘Chronotopia’ contend that such a **‘cyclical repetition’** (Armitage and Roberts, 2002: 52) is **particularly dangerous** because the fantasy of control remains exactly that, a **fantasy**. At the same time, this increasingly forceful repetition **can only eventually give way to ‘the accident’ because chronotopian speed-spaces are fundamentally and exponentially unstable**. Armitage and Roberts’ idea of ‘cyclical repetition’ through chronotopianism does thus not mean an exact repetition of the speed-elite’s quest for mastery – instead, I would argue that it is this **immanent quality of difference in repetition**, of the ‘**essential drifting due to [a technology’s] iterative structure** cut off from […] consciousness as the authority of the last analysis’ as Derrida calls it in ‘Signature Event Context’ (Derrida, 1982: 316) **that allows for the accident or true event to appear**. The difference through technologically sped-up repetition appears then perhaps as a potential, but only precisely as a growing potential that cannot be willed – in this sense, it will be an unanticipated event indeed. One could then speak of an intensification of politics in what is perhaps too hastily called the neo-liberal university, opening up unexpected spaces for critique in the face of its neo-liberalisation, which in turn points to **the fundamental instability of its enterprise**. Activist-research projects add to this intensification by virtue of their **techno-acceleration**. This intensification of politics is **no ground for univocal celebration**, since it remains also the hallmark of the neo-liberal mode of production of knowledge through the new tele-technologies as excellent, regardless of its critical content. The current university’s instability mirrors and aggravates the volatility of a capitalism marked by non-sustainability, a growing feminisation of poverty, the rise of a new global upper class, and **highly mediated illusions of cybernetic mastery**. **This nonetheless also opens up new forms of thought, if only appearing as ‘accidents’**. Derrida hints at this, but also at the university’s elusiveness, in ‘Mochlos, or: the Conflict of the Faculties’, when he claims that he ‘would almost call [the university] the child of an inseparable couple, metaphysics and technology’ (Derrida, 1993: 5, emphasis mine). Almost, but never quite – **here then emerges the possibility of truly subversive change**. But **this change will not be brought about by the mere content of the critique, but by the way it pushes acceleration to the point of systemic disintegration or implosion**. In Fatal Strategies, **Baudrillard calls this the ‘fatal strategy’ that contemporary theory must adopt: a sort of conceptual suicide attack which aims at pulling the rug out from under the speed-elitist mobilisation of semiotic oppositions, and which shows the paradox behind any attempt at structural predictions.** In ‘The Final Solution’, Baudrillard relates this intensification of the humanist obsession with dialectics, mastery, and transparency – the quest for immortality that is at the basis of techno-scientific research – to **destruction and the death drive** through the metaphor of and actual research around cloning, which strangely resonates well with Derrida’s investigation of the tele-technological archive in Archive Fever. **I read Baudrillard’s ‘Final Solution’ here as a metaphor for the duplication (cloning) of thought into virtual spaces outside the university walls proper**. If contemporary research seeks to make human cloning possible, argues Baudrillard, then **this endeavour is equivalent to cancer**: after all, cancer is simply automatic cloning, a deadly form of multiplication. It is of interest here to note that the possibility of creating an army of clones has likewise **garnered much military interest**, just **as academia today more and more serves military ends**. As the logic of cloning as automatic multiplication is typical of all current technological and humanist advancements, **the exacerbation of this logic can only mean more promise and death**. At this point my argument mirrors **the apocalyptic tone of the activist-research projects**. In the final analysis, the problem with Edu-Factory, Facoltà di Fuga, Investigacció, Universidad Nómada, Ricercatori Precari, and Glocal Research Space is that these projects entail a very specific form of subjugation with dire consequences for the slower and less techno-genic classes. Techno-scientific progress entails a regress into immortality, epitomised by a nostalgia typical of the current socio-technical situation, for when we were ‘undivided’ (Baudrillard, 2000: 6). I contend that Baudrillard refers not only to the lifeless stage before humans became sexed life forms, but also makes an allusion to psycho-analytic readings of the ‘subject divided in language’ and its nostalgia for wholeness and transparent communication. **The desire for immortality, like archive fever, is therefore the same as the Freudian death drive, and we ourselves ultimately become the object of our technologies of scrutiny and nostalgia**. **The humanist quest of totally transparency of oneself and of the world to oneself that grounds the idea of the modern techno-scientific university, is ultimately an attempt at (self-)destruction, or in any case an attempted destruction of (one’s) radical difference [alterity]. The urgent political question**, which Stiegler problematically avoided in Disorientation, then becomes: which selves are and will become caught up in the delusion of total self-transparency and self-justification, and which selves will be destroyed? And how may we conceive of **an ‘ethic of intellectual inquiry or aesthetic contemplation’** that **‘resists the imperatives of speed’**, as Jon Cook likewise wonders in ‘The Techno-University and the Future of Knowledge’ (Cook, 1999: 323)? It is of particular importance to note here that **the very inception of this question and its possible analysis, like the conception of the speed-elite, is itself again a performative repetition of the grounding myth of the university of independent truth, justice and reason**. Therefore, in carrying forward the humanist promise, this analysis is itself bound up in the intensification of the logic of acceleration and destruction, and that is then also equally tenuous. This complicity of thought in the violence of acceleration itself in turn quickens the machine of the humanist promise, and can only manifest itself in the prediction of a coming apocalypse – whether it concerns a narrative of the death of thought and the university, or of a technological acceleration engendering the Freudian death drive. **We are then simply the next target in the technological realisation of complete** γνωθι σαυτον (**know thyself) – or so it seems. Because after all, a clone is never an exact copy, as Baudrillard very well knows; and therefore, the extent to which activist-research projects hopefully invite alterity can thankfully not yet be thought.**

## Inherency

#### 1--Biden has formalized enforcement of the aff already – even if he hasn’t, deterrence checks

1AC Rosalsky jul 20 [KU = Green] (Greg. Greg is a reporter for NPR’s “Planet Money”. National Public Radio “The Untamed Rise Of Hospital Monopolies”. Accessed 8/15/21. <https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2021/07/20/1017631111/the-untamed-rise-of-hospital-monopolies>.//LS)

Last month, Michigan's two largest hospital systems, Spectrum Health and Beaumont Health, announced they wanted to become one. The $12.9 billion "megamerger" would create a health industrial complex spanning 22 hospitals, 305 outpatient facilities, and an insurance company. It would employ 64,000 people, making it the largest employer in Michigan. Local newspapers had [expected](https://click.nl.npr.org/?qs=aac6a52802998e4c874d348d09d013ee6fac4afcaa868f51b9ba9812e6564a6014246c86c9911ad577c2c989fcb3411a69bff4b5bdaa8990) the merger to "sail through" government approval. But now they're [not so sure](https://click.nl.npr.org/?qs=aac6a52802998e4cb2ec16e3cb13d72e48351e2cc2a1515e26419299bbebc270fde9d94f82535cfdcd56f2cc7e81124d1be58f4cbc4ac965). That's because President Biden recently signed an executive order saying his administration was serious about promoting competition, and he specifically singled out hospitals as an area where growing monopolization is a concern. The order, [the White House says](https://click.nl.npr.org/?qs=aac6a52802998e4cb30f686eec44ad08aa95d8c8d87561e95acc115cf414796a479cbdc2a29c23723b64aba89a4f3d92a252b54a0e2c5c82), "underscores that hospital mergers can be harmful to patients and encourages the Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to review and revise their merger guidelines to ensure patients are not harmed by such mergers." Hospitals are a really important part of the American economy. Not just in terms of health and wellbeing, but in terms of dollars and cents. The largest chunk of America's healthcare spending goes to hospitals. And the hospital sector is one of the largest sectors in the overall American economy, accounting for [about 6 percent](https://click.nl.npr.org/?qs=aac6a52802998e4c990362d9064534376d0f112a51a4355aea1dbc927a0880a203f31eeaadb8c2ac20c7d67fb5099d6554b04aac49559f24) of America's GDP. Hospitals do a lot of good things. They save lives. They create good jobs. But because of growing monopolization of them, Zack Cooper, an economist at Yale School of Public Health, worries that they're becoming like a "Dracula" that "sucks some of the vibrancy out of a lot of towns across the country." Cooper and his colleague, Martin Gaynor, have crunched the numbers on hospitals using the government's preferred way of measuring market concentration, and they've found that [about 80%](https://click.nl.npr.org/?qs=aac6a52802998e4c0b1652603c21631d660ea6328799483443b10b4cf0e407ef7a0e1fbdb9359303a4232b1b21ff1d1fb258a48bcaa2c9b4) of America's hospital markets are now "highly concentrated." "The average hospital market in the U.S. is just way over what the FTC and the DOJ would consider a healthy level of concentration," Cooper says. Many of these markets, he says, are dominated by just one or two hospitals, giving them market power to suck extra money from communities for health procedures and emergencies. In addition to decades of mergers and acquisitions with hospitals gobbling up other hospitals, hospitals have also been increasingly buying up physician practices. Economists refer to this as "vertical integration." Think steel manufacturers buying the railroad lines. Like with mergers and acquisitions, Cooper says, many of these deals have not received adequate scrutiny from federal regulators. The research clearly shows, Cooper says, that growing monopolization has raised prices for patients. Less competition means hospitals can charge higher prices and get away with it. They can pay lower wages and get away with it. And they can provide worse care and get away with it. "We want firms to compete and be incentivized to raise their quality to attract more consumers, and the more that hospitals merge, the less sharp those incentives become," Cooper says. "We have evidence that death rates are literally [higher](https://click.nl.npr.org/?qs=aac6a52802998e4c5c1aaef55148e0a3c35e11600f3e40833c154e0c77d978ccedddd5faf3c5a0fe6e390ff4c85e2dc7b04e6c5c1169a406) in markets where hospitals face less competition." The bizarre part of all this is that many of these monopolizing hospitals are technically considered "nonprofits." There are, apparently, "a lot of nonprofits to be made in the healthcare industry," Cooper jokes. He doesn't take their "nonprofit" status very seriously. He sees it more like a game where instead of making profits that are distributed to shareholders, nonprofit hospitals take the extra money they make and use it for executive compensation and buying shiny stuff. Cooper says nonprofit hospitals tend to "overinvest in technology. And the irony of that is that you get even more expensive gizmos that are probably not necessary in the first place — and they suck more money into the healthcare system." Being a non-profit offers hospitals some quirky benefits. They don't have to pay taxes like for-profit businesses do. And while the FTC can block anti-competitive mergers between non-profit hospitals, they are hamstrung in investigating non-profit hospitals for anti-competitive conduct under current law. "It's sort of ~~crazy~~," Cooper says. Many of these markets, he says, are dominated by just one or two hospitals, giving them market power to suck extra money from communities for health procedures and emergencies.

## Advantage

### 1nc – presumption

#### 1--Vote negative on presumption – nothing about the plan or the aff’s speech resolves ableism as an underlying system of oppression or exhaustion that arises from disability existing in ontological excess of the normative human

### 1nc – turn

#### 2--Economic managerialism like the affs use of antitrust necessitates debilitation of populations – turns the aff

Scannell 18 (R. Joshua Scannell – Assistant Professor of Digital Media Theory at New School's School of Media Studies. “Electric Light: Automating the Carceral State During the Quantification of Everything” A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Sociology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York [2018] <https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3617&context=gc_etds>, DOA: 9/25/21, kbb)

In 1913, Brandeis is economic policy advisor to Woodrow Wilson and his Progressive New Freedom project. While Wilson makes himself busy Progressively segregating the federal government, the future justice of the Supreme Court focuses on banks. Against anti-trust regulation or nationalization, Brandeis argues that the best way to break financial houses’ control over the economy is to publish their service fees. Doing so, he claims, alerts investors to unfair practices, incentivizes them to invest with honest houses, and forces banks to behave fairly. “Sunlight,” he says, “is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman” (Brandeis 2009). Brandeis is wrong about sunlight regulating banks. In the absence of effective state regulation, they continue to concentrate power, and eventually collapse, triggering the Great Depression. But his slogan becomes a mantra for what Tariq Ali calls the “Extreme Center” of American politics (Ali 2015). The Extreme Center, made up of political agents of all parties whose allegiance is to the maintenance of free market capitalism at all costs, is in 2014 caught between the rock of “transparent” racial state violence and the hard place that necessitates statesanctioned armed cadres to maintain a fraying political economic structure. Overwhelmed, the extreme center insist that the facts aren’t in, and call for better data, and for better analytics. Or for what Lim, quoting Brandeis, calls “sunshine.” In the mid 2010s, that call for “sunshine” translates into the rollout of police worn body cameras on the one hand, and improved resource management software on the other. Critics like Elizabeth Joh point out that, from a civil rights standpoint, police worn body cams are a disaster (E. E. Joh 2016). She’s right (E. Joh 2016). The distinction between transparency (“sunshine”) and surveillance is fictive to begin with (Levy and Johns 2016). For instance: The Axon Corporation, formerly called Taser, is most famous for its formernamesake “less lethal” police weapon. But it is also the largest producer of police worn body cameras, among a range of other surveillance technologies and analytics systems. As early as 2010, Taser articulates a vision of integrating facial recognition technology into police worn body cameras that can scan crowds and match faces to outstanding warrants in real time (Gross 2010). In 2017, the company pivots its business model to analytics. In April 2017, the company announces that Taser is now Axon, and will offer free body cameras, as well as “supporting hardware, software, data storage, training, and support to police departments free of cost for one year.” Axon plans to use a proprietary, expanding database of body camera videos to develop technology that can “anticipate criminal activity” by reading body language to warn officers if “someone’s demeanor has changed and may now be a threat” (Kofman 2017). So, the tool to achieve greater transparency (“sunshine”), and heal the trust deficit between police and “the communities they protect” is also how police surveillance generalizes, and how analytics automates carceral precarity, debilitating populations (Puar 2017). What the extreme center never says out loud is that the other side of transparency and sunshine is the policeman, and electric light. In September 2014, a few months before Lim publishes his article in Newsweek, the New York Times runs a report on policing in Brownsville, a poor and largely black neighborhood in Brooklyn. A new Mayor, Bill de Blasio, has recently been elected on the promise of ending the New York Police Department’s unconstitutional Stop, Question, and Frisk policy (Vaughan 2013). The reporter is in Brownsville to see what has changed since the city pivoted to its new strategy, called “Omnipresence.” He finds: police cruisers parked at every junction, emergency lights flashing until the early hours of the morning; powerful floodlights on all night pointed at public housing projects’ windows; officers patrolling building interiors with flashlights on and guns drawn; helicopters flying overhead, shining searchlights down at the neighborhood. Electric light, everywhere. One person who lives in the neighborhood tells the reporter that “[we] feel like we live under siege” (J. Goldstein 2014). Omnipresence is the brainchild of Commissioner Bill Bratton, who, in 2014, is pushing hard to drive NYPD’s information technology development. The NYPD’s Information Technology Bureau estimates that implementing the total wish list will cost $350 million. It includes plans to build a proprietary fiber optic network for the police, new data centers and cloud capability, efforts to link NYPD camera feeds with independent agencies (like NYCHA), to construct a citywide data fusion center under NYPD control, to expand the existing Domain Awareness System nerve center for processing data streams and to push that system’s platform to field officers, to install ShotSpotter gunshot detection centers city-wide, to contract predictive policing software as a service from a private company, to equip officers with body cameras, and to issue NYPD emails to officers (New York City Police Department 2015). These are a different sort of omnipresence; a different set of techniques for leveraging algorithms to bathe a city in electric light. In Dark Matters, Simone Browne introduces the concept of “black luminosity” as a framework for understanding the racializing violence that inheres in the productive surveillance of blackness. Black Luminosity is “a form of boundary maintenance occurring at the site of the black body, whether by candlelight, flaming torch, or the camera flashbulb that documents the ritualized terror of a lynch mob.” This boundary maintenance is “intricately tied to knowing the black body, subjecting some to a high visibility…by way of technologies of seeing that sought to render the subject outside of the category of the human, un-visible” (Browne 2015, 67-68). We might add to this historical list floodlights, CCTVs, facial recognition software, gait matching software, social media surveillance, data fusion, predictive policing, body cameras, surveillant sensors, heat maps, compstat maps. In other words, the 21st century technological assemblage of black luminosity that underwrites American matrices of domination (Collins 2009) Algorithmic policing – Electric Light – is a deepening and extension of the boundary making that Browne identifies. Emerging concerns about digital surveillance technologies - that they inhumanize and dividuate people to circulate their data as valuable, securable information (boyd and Crawford 2012, Lyon 2011) are in some ways a much-belated realization of the process by which taxonomies of the body have organized and distributed population. Against the concern that digital surveillance presents a new problem of reducing people to constituent parts and alienates the subject from itself and from the law, we might look to Jennifer Morgan’s argument in Laboring Women that early modern European taxonomies of non-white women were central to nascent state projects of colonialism. These taxonomies laid the intellectual, financial, and ideological groundwork needed to produce captive labor forces on which new modes of capitalist accumulation could be built (Morgan 2004). Morgan argues that a fundamental technique of the production and circulation of what we now understand as “race” was European explorers’ efforts to “read” non-European women’s bodies as uniquely capable of producing new bodies for captivity through pregnancy and reproduction while also doing agricultural labor. This subtended a colonial fascination with the imagined physicality of the “indigenous other.” European “experts,” for instance, argued that nonEuropean women’s breasts were especially and monstrously elongated so that babies could be carried on their backs and “suckle o’er their shoulder” while they did agricultural labor. The (imagined) breast became a key metric, along with the supposed ease and painlessness of delivery, by which Europeans determined the sliding scale of populational fitness for civilization or enslavement. Biometrics and racialization have always been of a part (Ajana 2013, Browne 2015, Duster 2003) And the racializing technologies of biometrics always require illumination. Eighteenth century British colonial authorities in New York developed what Browne calls “Lantern Laws” in response to widespread enslaved’ and indigenous resistance to the colonial regime. The white ruling class feared that the free and untracked movement of enslaved persons invited danger. Where enslaved people could freely meet and talk, they could strategize insurrection and plan revolt. These laws thus mandated that black and native persons, when walking two or more at a time and unaccompanied by a white person were required, after dark, to carry lit candle lanterns. They were made to be luminous (Browne 2015, 76-83). An urban reimagining of the rural “pass,” the Lantern Laws organized the imagined infrastructure of the city through the circulation of illuminated black and native bodies (Hadden 2003; Browne 2015). Colonial luminosity assembles surveillant technologies (candles, lanterns), racial technologies (bondage, property rights), capital (the sea, the ship, the financial instrument, the east India company) and imperial affects (the impetus for these laws is to defend the sanctity of the afternoon tea ceremony) to map carceral, colonial New York. Back to the future, in 2014, the New York Police Department assembles surveillant technologies (cctv, ShotSpotter, crime mapping, gait matching, facial recognition, automated license plate readers, predictive policing), racial technologies (incarceration, underfunded schools, rent gouging, poor wages), capital (credit, real estate value, data farming, analytics), and imperial affects (the colorblind land of opportunity, the American dream) to map carceral, 21st century New York. As in Brownsville in 2014, so too in colonial New York: the mobility and opacity of free white colonial subjects depends on black and native bodies’ forced illumination. In their passage through the colonial city, black and native bodies were not only forced to present before the panoptic regard of the white gaze, they were constitutive of sovereignty’s field of vision (Kelley 1996, Bell 1992, Scott 1999, Ong 2006). As in the 18th century, so the 21st: racialized bodies’ “improper” movement (including the refusal to “move along”) in and through New York invites a range of punishments, up to and including torture and death. Surveillance, torture, capital, necropolitics, biometrics, carceral securitization, hot spot policing. The conflation of the terrorist and the criminal all coalesce across time and space. Light organizes race. Police tactics have not changed much. We may not call them “Lantern Laws” anymore, but NYPD’s “Omnipresence” strategy positions police floodlights in and around “high crime” neighborhoods so that the police can see, can “know,” when and where people of color move about the city. The designation of “high crime neighborhood” is itself a certain type of luminosity. The heat maps that transform the lived environment into a state target, and depress the constitutional protections of people living under conditions of “high crime” (Ferguson and Bernache 2008) are themselves the product of the ubiquitous racialized surveillance that Broken Windows reauthorized in the 1990s, and that Microsoft analytics digitizes on behalf of “the public.” Risk, heat maps, hot spots, and predictive policing are some of the 21st century’s techniques for illuminating the progress of “dangerous” bodies through the urban environment. So, the logic of securitization endures. What has changed is that inhumanist techniques of “algorithmic governance” now deliberately disaggregate the metrics of flesh from any imagined figure of the human (Negarestani 2014a; Terranova 2007; Patricia T. Clough 2010). Electric light means an intensification of the violent, profitable production of flesh against the body, hidden behind mathematical parameters, and “progressive” reforms (Spillers 2003). There is not a contradiction between a more accountable and technologically savvy police department and siege. The former makes the latter possible. But the techniques of policing and organized dispossession (Harvey 2004) that constitute the “changing same” of American carceral capitalism are nonetheless transforming. Jasbir Puar writes about the Israeli occupation of Palestine as “inhumanist biopolitics,” in which state power turns on the deliberate debilitation and stunting of target populations (Puar 2015). This “right to maim,” she argues, is useful to contemporary modes of imperial rule that depend on comporting with the letters, if not spirit, of international human rights benchmarks. By rendering subject populations debilitated, rather than dead, regimes suspend victimized communities in a profitable interstice of “will not let or make die.” Populations in such necropolitical limbos provide the grist for expanding domestic security industries, non-governmental organizations, medical research, and other sectors whose use-value accrues from the profitable management of organized debility (Puar 2017). The term “inhumanist biopolitics” tracks two theoretical lines in this mode of debilitative governmentality. On the one hand, that it is biopolitical in the “classical” Foucauldian sense of the word. It is a logic of governing that is dependent on figuring some populations’ bodies for maximum life and capacity and others for slow death (Berlant 2007) and debility through a positive feedback loop between state science, state racism, biological knowledge, and what David Beer calls “metric power” (Beer 2016; Foucault 1978). On the other hand, Reza Negarestani’s (2011) term, “inhumanism” denotes a break with the “human” temporalities and figures that frame “biopolitics” (Negarestani 2014b). Negarestani’s concept of the “labor of the inhuman” is dense, and I will not attempt a full excursus. To gloss, Negarestani argues that, “humanist” and “anti-humanist” conceptions of “the human” are rooted in nostalgic (imagined historical) or theological (either explicitly religious, phenomenal, or “natural”) reifications of “human” as coherent, and self-evident figure. Inhumanism reworks “human” as a process of constant renovation and construction – what he calls “the revisionary catastrophe.” His point is that, pragmatically, what “human” means is under incessant revision and stress, and that this stress comes “as a force that travels back from the future to alter, if not to completely discontinue, the command of its origin.” To commit, politically, ethically, or intellectually, to “human” means taking as a starting point the constant destabilization of “the human” that unfolds from the future. The systems through which “human” is distributed are multiscalar, complex, and functional (in the sense that they are processual and material). “Humans” do not preexist these systems’ feedback processes, which splay the “human” across diachronic temporalities. Negarestani means (I think) to develop the concept of inhumanism as a tool for liberation, as a means for reckoning with the failures of liberatory politics and philosophies to make sense of the ways in which cascading technics and technologies ontologically destabilize sociocultural units of analysis and action. While there is certainly merit in this aspect of the project, inhumanism scans much more readily as Puar invokes it: as a schematic analysis of contemporary forms of (post)-biopolitical control.To return to Puar’s example of Gaza, we might ask how to conceive of the temporal scales of the epigenetic research streams that flow from Gazans’ toxified bodies. Militarized epigenetic research is driven by a speculative loop that aims to locate a proteinate source of Palestinian resistance to occupation. Occupation policy aims to debilitate “generational time” by inflicting “psychological and cognitive injuries” that “stunt” human development, foreclosing the possibility of children’s resistance in an indeterminate future. These tactics decant “the human” from its molecular composition to make Palestinians “literalized and lateralized as surface, as bodies without souls, as sheer biology, thus ironically rendered non-human, part of creating surface economies of control, and captured in non-human temporal calculations” (Puar 2015, 15). The ultimate target of these tactics of (literal) molecularization, and debilitation is an old “biopolitical fantasy, that resistance can be located, stripped, and emptied.” In these occupational dynamics, resistance itself’ becomes a target of computational metrics: How to measure, calculate, and capture resistance? But not only is biopolitical control a fundamentally productive assemblage; the ontological irreducibility of ‘resistance itself’ is elusive at best” (ibid). Eyal Weizman explains this conjunction of biopoltical control, transnational norms, computational capacity, and technocratic measurement in the context of possible soldiers’ defense against war crime charges brought under the framework of “International Humanitarian Law (IHL).” He notes that militaries have, in part due to pressure from international humanitarian organizations and national legal bodies, increasingly adopted automated and robotic technologies to command, control, and govern the normative distribution of violence and death (Weizman 2011). This integration has transformed military action into a systemic process of command and control “that is undertaken by a diffuse assemblage of sensors, automatic weapons, computers and optics together with human operators, overseers and regulators.” This inhumanist structure makes it nearly impossible to identify, with any certainty, nodes at which war crime violations take place. Computers and sensors cannot be held responsible for the commission of crimes, and human operators are often acting under their “direction,” which is normally “designed” to inflict minimal, rather than maximal violence (Chamayou 2013). Weizman points out that this produces a perverse circumstance in which a human accused of committing war crimes might feasibly launch a legal defense on the grounds that they inflicted maximal possible violence. Against computers’ antiseptic program of minimally inflicted damage elongated over the maximal duree, the human warfighter evinces humanity by committing greater violence than is asked or “required.” As Weizman puts it, “The breach of the techno-civilized logic of computation and calculations could thus be argued as madness itself” (Weizman 2011, 16). Perhaps it is madness, but it reads like meticulous work. In particular, it conjures the infrastructures of human commodification that undergird the “intimacies of four continents” in the black Atlantic (Lowe 2015; Gilroy 1993). It reads like the “protocol of search and destroy” that Hortense Spillers identifies as the “zero degree of social conceptualization” between “body” and “flesh” (Spillers 2003). The digitally driven surveillance and control techniques that render Palestinians soulless “surface economies of control” may call to mind, as many have argued, a posthuman reordering of Giorgio Agamben’s concept of bare life in an “algorithmic state of exception” (McQuillan 2015). But, following scholars like Alexander Weheliye (Weheliye 2014) I want to suggest that the musselman of the Nazi camps is not, as Agamben (Agamben 1999) argues, the zero degree of this moment’s methods for inscribing a “hieroglyphics of the flesh” (Spillers 2003). There is nothing particularly “exceptional” about the dehiscence of “human” from “flesh” (Moten 2008; Pitts-Taylor 2011a), nor have those terms historically relied on “life,” no matter how bare. Dylan Rodriguez argues in “Forced Passages” that the carceral organization and mechanization of the Middle Passage is the working prototype for the contemporary “prison regime” (Rodriguez 2007). For Rodriguez, the American prison regime, like the Middle Passage “is a point of massive human departure—from civil society, the free world, and the mesh of affective social bonds and relations that produce varieties of ‘human’ family and community” (Rodriguez 2007, 40) that exceeds economic logic. Although organized by and in response to assemblages of speculative capital, labor transformation, and mutually articulating state and economic crises, Rodriguez argues that both regimes are tutelary. In both cases, the regimes serve “a pedagogical and punitive” function that, in the case of Middle Passage “deployed strategies of unprecedented violence to “teach” captive Africans and coerce them into the methods of an incipient global ordering.” The Prison Regime has Come to form a hauntingly similar spatial and temporal continuum between social and biological notions of life and death, banal liberal civic freedom and totalizing unfreedom, community and alienation, agency and liquidation, the “human” and the sub- and nonhuman. In a reconstruction of the Middle Passage’s constitutive logic, the reinvented prison regime is openly articulating and self-valorizing a commitment to efficient and effective bodily immobilization within the mass-based ontological subjection of human beings (Ibid. 48). Rodriguez points out that contemporary digital technologies of surveillance and control represent an “epochal leap from the carceral practices of the Middle Passage” that “Represents a multiplication of the potential sites and scenarios of subjection and physical punishment. This high technology re-maps prisoners’ bodies onto a virtual terrain, abstracting their bodily movements and gestures into a computerized grid of obedience and disobedience, submission and violation. Such innovations effect a re-spatialization of the prison itself, marking the extension and veritable omnipresence of the state’s capacity to practice a violent domination over its “inmates” (Ibid. 50). Technologies designed to extend the surveillant reach and punitive freedom of the carceral state are ontological conditions for racial capitalism, rather than the ramifications of a state of exception. To Agamben’s argument that the logic of “security” has, after 2001, instituted a sort of soft crisis in which biometric technologies that were “invented for recidivist criminals, [and] remained for longtime their exclusive privilege” have now been turned on the general population, thus undermining Western countries’ claim to “democracy” or even “politics” (Agamben 2014), we can posit Simone Browne’s point that race has always been a biometric project, and Western “democracy” and “politics” has likewise always been “impossible.” What Browne (2009) calls “digital epidermalization,” the “exercise of power cast by the disembodied gaze of certain surveillance technologies (for example, identity card and e-passport verification machines) that can be employed to do the work of alienating the subject by producing a ‘truth’ about the body and one’s identity (or identities) despite the subject’s claims,” does not have its roots in the “crisis” of the post-9/11 terror state, but the “mathematics” of racialization (Browne 2010, 135). Or, as Katherine McKittrick puts it, “the list, the breathless numbers, the absolutely economic, the mathematics of the unliving” to which the “pedagogical” regime of Middle Passage sought to reduce black life (McKittrick 2014, Rodriguez 2007). Digital policing technologies are a contemporary iteration of this mathematics. They are part and parcel of a broad reorganization of the techniques and tactics of racialization and value concurrent with digital capitalism’s “quantification of everything” (Browne 2010, 2015). Just as Rodriguez argues that the rudimentary digital surveillant technologies of turn of the 21st century prisons were an “epochal leap” from the Middle Passage, I am going to argue that the contemporary datafication and mathematization of the world has conditioned another “epochal leap” in which the target of the carceral state ceases to strictly be “human,” or “life” but rather “population,” and “liveliness.” In other words, to circle back to Puar and Negarestani: policing is “inhumanist.” As an example, let’s consider predictive policing – a contemporary (if somewhat minor) technology that we will circle back to throughout the dissertation. Predictive policing consolidates and operationalizes risk, possibility, and insecurity as ontological indeterminacies against which apparatuses of security must be brought to bear in a state of durable crisis. This long crisis is both beyond exception in that it is mundane, and also in that it depends on the feeding back from the future of “inhumanist” (Negarestani 2014b) populations of insecurity. These are the predicted calamities to come – the digitally realized failures to act on a future subjunctive that hemorrhages consequences in the present. From the “perp” not arrested to the stock not shorted, the future materializes as demand for action in the present, and as the ongoing failure to not have acted “otherwise.” In practical terms, this means an intensification of policing surveillance logics and practices, and circulations of risk historically generated by the carceral archipelagos of racial capitalism (Nelson 2016, Duster 2012, Gandy 2009, Foucault 1995; C. Robinson 2000). This “epochal leap” is not just a byproduct of changing technologies, or the unfortunate result of an interesting set of technical solutions being used to bad effect (O’Neil 2016). It was engineered with the specific intent of transforming policing from reactive enforcement of the penal regime to proactive agent of digital capitalism’s economic infrastructure. The impetus for this was the state crisis of the 1970s and 1980s. In the face of massive popular resistance to the American penal regime, American cadres of law and order reimagined the racial-sexual rationales of American racial capitalism as plausibly different from the historical cartographies of racialsexual difference (McKittrick 2006; Gilmore 2007). Policing became inhumanist because the police could no longer justify their mission in “human” – (or should we say dehumanizing) terms. The solution was to shift the terms that justified American policing. From the “condemnation of blackness” (Muhammad 2010) that epistemologically enframed policing during the postwar Race liberal order (Melamed 2010), advocates of state repression turned to “swift and sure” “law and order” maintenance as a praxis of technocratic common sense (Hall et al 2013, Gilmore 2009). Against race, police intellectuals leveraged the imagined neutrality of “math” and “prediction” (Harcourt 2007). That turn is at the root of the bad faith question that haunts most criticism of the consolidated techno-dystopian present: How can an algorithm be racist and sexist (Brennan 2015)? In the closing days of 2015, Ray Kelly and Bill Bratton -- two of the most powerful figures in US law enforcement -- made national headlines for fighting over data-entry methodology. (Fermino, Sandoval, and Tracy 2015; FOX 2015; Weichselbaum and Blau 2014; Levitt 2015, Yee 2014). The fight itself was frivolous, but it elicited a degree of rancor from public officials that illustrates just how central the minutiae of data collection and analysis is to narratives of 21st century crime control. Only twenty-one years prior to Bratton and Kelly’s spat, the NYPD did not even record regular statistics except to file semiannual Unified Crime Reports to the FBI. The extensive use of digital databases to granularly track crime and disruption dates to 1994, when Bratton introduced the CompStat system to the NYPD. In the years since, data-driven police management has become commonplace and widespread. It increasingly mirrors contemporary corporate management schemes and structures -- what you might call a proof-of-concept for remaking America’s civil service in Silicon Valley’s image. In 2009, for instance, the LAPD explicitly recommended that cutting edge departments look for best practices in the algorithmically driven logistics and data mining strategies championed by companies like Wal-Mart and Amazon (C. Beck and McCue 2009) rather than in public safety agencies. Digitization as a police strategy has grown in tandem with the centrality of digital capital. Of course, it’s no revelation that police strategies and aims transform with shifts in political economy: Police exist to ensure the viability of a society’s capacity for social reproduction. That is, after all, what it means to maintain “law and order” or “keep the peace” (Hall et all 2013, Gilmore 2007, Linebaugh 1992). This not only means enforcing regimes of economic dispossession (the law) but cooperating with state and infrastate agencies to produce populations primed for debilitation and exploitation (Puar 2017, Beckett and Murakawa 2012), or what Foucault calls “racism” (Foucault 1978) and Ruth Wilson Gilmore defines as “the state- sanctioned or extralegal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerability to premature death” (Gilmore 2007, 28). Terms such as “group-differentiation,” “vulnerability,” and “premature death” are noncategorical – each is a metastable range of intelligibility brought into being through techniques of measurement. Articulating that range demands stewardship and benchmarks, rationalizing techniques and social investment (Latour 1999). It requires social projects that conjure bodies as objects of (dis)investment, discipline, punishment, and control. Race, in other words, is technology. It organizes the horizons of the social and directs the technical apparatuses of the state and its surrogates to intervene differently in different bodies, structuring the spaces, times, and places in which those bodies concatenate as targets for management (Roberts 2011; Benjamin 2016). This, of course, is what Michel Foucault called biopolitics: a distribution of life chances, or the exposure to premature death, that is articulated at the level of the population and legitimated by invoking the health of the polity (Foucault 2008, 1978). Biopolitical projects are in turn managed by a tripartite political structure that he collectively refers to as governmentality. For Foucault, governmentality is a “complex form of power, which has as its target the population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security” (Foucault 2007). Governance under capitalism is, in other words, a project of differentiation that is instrumentalized at the level of the population to organize exposure and vulnerability to facilitate accumulation. The current centrality of metrics to what Bratton calls “the practice of policing” (Bratton 2016) is in keeping with 21st-century governmentality’s inhumanist investment in prevailing technologies of neoliberal accumulation (Roberts 2010; Brown 2015). But it also indicates the reverse: that policing is increasingly central to the development of these metrics. After 1994, with the introduction of the COMPSTAT system, policing went from enforcing capitalist social relations to a leading innovator in reorganizing them. Like aught else, neoliberal reforms in 1980s New York drove a breakdown in the previous century’s practices of American policing. Spurred by the orchestrated collapse of Fordist disciplinary institutions like schools and factories, and the onset of a generalized “crisis” of crime, public and private leaders demanded a transformation of police logics from an integrated, criminal justice model to a proactive, punitive one centered on maintaining “order” (Murakawa 2008, Phillips-Fein 2017, Henry 2002, McDonald 2001). Order, of course, is not a neutral term, and it tends to be defined against the vulnerable. The homeless, for instance, were in 1980s and 1990s New York considered, ipso facto, to be signs of “disorder.” By 1994, public discourses of “order” explicitly tethered the term to wealth, proximity to whiteness, and heteronormative sexual discretion (Hanhardt 2013, Delaney 1999). The “Zero Tolerance” campaign to “retake” New York City in the 1990s was waged explicitly in defense of that particular intersectional “order” (Smith 1996; Vitale 2009). It is in the context of that campaign to make the city safe for neoliberalism that the computer, and its analytic capacities, emerges as a central tool of policing. Overwhelmed by the scale and scope of its adopted civilizing mission, and heavily influenced by neoliberal management theory’s love affair with cybernetics, the 1990s NYPD turned to digital statistics and mapping software to organize their campaign against “crime.” This set the stage for a transformation in what Clough and Craig Willse call the “political branding” of crime such that it came “to resonate with the more ordinary biopolitics of branding policy and programming, or what might be referred to as the ‘technical solutions’ of making live and letting die” (Patricia Ticineto Clough and Willse 2010, 49-50). CompStat’s influence is enormous. It is not merely an innovation in police management protocol, but a coalescence of strategies designed to produce and manage surplus populations in the context of massive political economic restructuring (Patricia T. Clough 2010). It is also a peerless example of what Michel Callon et al have called “technical democracy,” in which metrics and number stand for transparency and political community (Callon, Lascoumes, and Barthe 2009). CompStat’s reflection of the American political economy’s neoliberalization is crucial to its success as a political object (Harman 2009; Morton 2007, 2013) that has successfully reoriented commonsense understandings of how to govern crime and crime prevention. But CompStat also reorganizes the demands made of calculation and digitization to assemble heterotopic “liveliness” (Bennet 2010) that undergirds the emergent “stack” of planetary computation (Bratton 2015). If meta-level digital “worlding” (“the quantification of everything”) is the ontogenetic waypath for transnational capital after the crisis of neoliberalism, then the lodestar is CompStat. This is true first because if one scratches hard enough at political economy, one finds carceral infrastructure (Duster 2018, Heiner 2007, Harcourt 2011). And second, because CompStat diagrams an assemblage of racialized value and metric precision (Moten 2018), of biomedia and ontopower (Thacker 2006, Massumi 2011) that is directly inherited from longstanding traditions of American racial capitalism (Roberts 2011; Fouche 2012). Specifically, I refer to American racial capitalism’s metric production of the raced and gendered distinction between the “body” and “flesh” that Hortense Spillers argues is the “central one between captive and liberated subject-positions” (Spillers 2003, 206-207). Flesh, for Spillers, is “the zero degree of social conceptualization that does not escape concealment under the brush of discourse.” This flesh, she argues, is produced by the rending violence of racialization. It is, A kind of hieroglyphics…whose severe disjunctures come to be hidden to the cultural seeing by skin color…These lacerations, woundings, fissures, tears, scars, openings, ruptures, lesions, rendings, punctures of the flesh create the distance between what I would designate a cultural vestibularity and the culture, whose state apparatus, including judges, attorneys, “owners,” “soul drivers,” “overseers,” and “men of God,” apparently colludes with a protocol of “search and destroy” (Spillers 2003, 207). I want to return here to Browne’s theory of digital epidermalization in which the “white prototypicality” of biometric technologies organize “the computational means through which the body, or more specifically parts and pieces of it, are mathematically coded as data” in order to perform digitized racialization as a “fracture of the body from its humanness, refracted into a new subject position” that is “ontologically unstable” and subject to a “structured violence that is productive of and produced by a certain white normativity” (Browne 2009, 134-135). Where Browne focuses her cases of digital epidermalization on the productive and performative racializing violences of biometrics, I want to suggest that thinking through CompStat’s nonbiometric analytic frame lets us productively expand the concept of digital epidermalization to encompass a broader racializing assemblage in which the “protocol of search and destroy” is fed forward into a capacious rendering of the social field as ontologically destabilizing productive violence. This ontological destabilization occurs, under CompStat, at the level of governmentality, even as the “real life” violences of that ontological instability redound onto the intersectionally “same” historically violated bodies that are foundational platforms of racial capitalist extraction. That is to say, the digitalizing infrastructures of 21st century carceral capitalism do the work of digital epidermalization without necessary recourse either to biometrics or to “white prototypicality,” but always with recourse to “blackened” population racism and racialized extraction (Sojoyner 2017; Sharpe 2009). And because the capitalized digitalization of the ontologically destabilized social field is intrinsically cathected to, and in fact conditioned by, the carceral infrastructure of political economy, all the smart city’s sensor-laden streets lead back to the foundational dehiscence of “body” from “flesh,” to the “cultural vestibularity” of the “protocol of search and destroy” (Spillers 2003). Or, in other words, to a digitizing carceral state. Or, to put it more bluntly: we must heed the oft-repeated truth that surveillance and policing require neither digital technologies, nor complex technical infrastructure to be omnipresent, intrusive, and violent. That, in fact this is the specific work that racialization and gendering are meant to achieve (see e.g. Morgan 2004, Hartman 2007, Shabazz 2015, Amar 2013). Enfleshment under racial capitalism is precisely a project of group-differentiated debilitation because it weaponizes organic surveillance systems and organic complex technical infrastructures: that is to say bodies (Kaba 2015; Pitts-Taylor 2016, 2006) Cops don’t need surveillance cameras or biometric technologies, and banks don’t need automated credit forecasts to produce and police racial difference because “race” is already datafication, and human wetware, indeed the human sensorium, is already weaponized (Nelson 2016; Gumbs 2016; Kaba 2015). But, knowing that the correct answer to the question of whether policing requires advanced technology to violently perpetuate inequality is “no;” that Chicago Police are perfectly capable of terrorizing black and brown youth with or without automated heat lists; that the NYPD do not need surveillance vans to construe Muslim college students as terrorist, new technologies nevertheless make a difference. Database-driven, automated, digital technologies do real work to the real world even if the phenomenological fallout from those processes feels like more of the “changing same” (Gilmore 2007, Yost 2008, Fouche 2012). The fact that the product is the reproduction of already existing structures of oppression and exploitation speaks to the effectiveness of new iterations of digital epidermalization to do the work of maintaining racial and sexual difference while also reconfiguring corporeality for-and-as capital in new techno-shocked arrangements (Tallbear 2015; Brown 2015). The digital obviously does not introduce the idea of rending vulnerable flesh into profitability through “protocols of search and destroy” but it facilitates new ways in which capital flows into, out of, and through corporeality (Noble and Tynes 2016, Chun 2008, Povinelli 2016, Hansen 2015). This, in turn has an impact on ontologies of the body and its capacities that matters very much to the institutional commitments of carceral capital (Jackson 2016, Amoore 2013). The fact that this “mattering” is so very dear to “carceral capitalism” (Wang 2018) means, I think, that it ought to matter to those who would abolish those institutions and their intellectual foundations. So, to the question “does digital technology change everything or nothing?” we might characterize the deep center’s long-recurring answer as “everything needs to change, so everything can stay the same” (Lampedusa 2007) Pushing this argument, I am suggesting that the “smart city” is not so much the offspring of the historical violences that devalue the lives of the intersectionally oppressed, but rather the contemporary iteration of mutative institutions of inhumanist biopolitics that work to assign, with terribly mounting precision, the value of extractable life, and the liveliness of extractable value. Fred Moten calls the ontological condition of this “logistics in the hold” (Moten and Harney 2012), this surgery of life, capacity, and price “blur” (Moten 2018). I want to suggest that we also colloquially call a consolidating technosocial iteration of it “the cloud” (Peters 2015, Bratton 2015).

### 1nc – turn

#### 3--The discourse of referring to the “disabled” as separate re-entrenches normative modes of understanding ability – turns the case

Roberts 7 (Jeff Roberts, Bachelors in Communication Studies from Baylor, from his Master’s thesis – “The Rhetorical Structure of Disability: Bridging the Gap Between What is ‘Spoken’ and What is ‘Said’ with Song Over-Signifying with Personhood Against the Backdrop of Disease-Centric Discourse”, https://beardocs.baylor.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/2104/5086/Jeff\_Roberts\_Masters.pdf?sequence=1)

The viral nature of difference guarantees increased efforts of segregation, assimilation, and extermination with each glimmer of similarity recognized. Viral difference, similar to most viruses, operates as “a self-replicating code” which for survival feeds off the living host in which it attempts to destroy. When difference becomes the motivating factor in actions of acceptance and compassion, viral difference must replicate itself, often mutating forms, in the production of more difference which seeks to destroy any similarity created between the self and other (Baudrillard, 1993). Just as health provides energy for viral sickness, similarity provides impetus for viral difference, often when the different other becomes too similar to one’s self the individual self must create new forms of difference in order to maintain the identity of the self (Baudrillard, 1993). Congressional legislation aimed at achieving equality for people with disabilities represents a fatal strategy when deploying the disease-centric rhetoric of viral difference. This rhetorical “strategy” of the congressional act is generally unconscious and unintended, while it is “fatal” in respect to its ironic and self defeating potential; the language used to compel action towards equality is simultaneously the same language which creates attitudinal barriers blocking social equality for the group the act intends to help, people with disabilities. Given that difference cannot be simply accepted and incorporated “into a truly seamless and unpatched fabric; increasing unity, falling barriers and great reduction in real distance must of themselves compensate somewhere by means of new partitions and unanticipated gaps (Baudrillard, 1993, p. 129),” the advocacy of this paper attempts to avoid conceptualizations of difference all together. Being that “disability” is by definition a signifier of difference and cannot be divorced from such representations it becomes important to sever disability from the subject, rather than engaging in the impossible task of erasing difference from disability. The growth of modern medicine along with increased legislation pertaining to people with disabilities has eliminated the potential for Baudrillard’s alternative of “radical exoticism” to become a viable solution to the problems of difference, or to even have the possibility to exist in the status-quo. Increased interaction between the state, medicine, and individuals with and without disabilities has locked us in a position where foreignness has been eliminated and interaction mandated, so the question now becomes what form of interaction best facilitates ethical encounters with the subaltern other. In an examination of the rhetoric surrounding disability, “disease-centric discourse” will be criticized from a variety of perspectives, advancing the argument that such rhetoric places a primacy on the difference of a subject according to disability, and hence warrants rejection from legislation aimed at securing equality. An alternative rhetorical model of “people-first language” will be advanced as a way to facilitate ethical encounters with the other, a proper replacement to disease-centric rhetoric, and as a means of dislocating difference/disability from the individual. The end goal is to create a framework for action which bridges the gap between what is “spoken” and what is “said,” affirming progressive actions towards equality for people with disabilities with rhetorical purity. Pragmatic action by the state can represent a radical responsibility to the other, and when enacted in the rhetoric of people-first language it can simultaneously represent a commitment to alterity.

# 2NC

# 1NR

## K

**Democracy doesn’t exist and the public doesn’t influence policy - getting more education doesn’t improve their chances**

**Gilens & Page 14** Martin, Professor of Politics at Princeton University, and Benjamin, Gordon S. Fulcher Professor of Decision Making at Northwestern University, “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens”, American Political Science Association, Perspectives on Politics, September 2014 | Vol. 12/No. 3, p. 575-577

Each of our four theoretical traditions (Majoritarian Electoral Democracy, Economic-Elite Domination, Majoritarian Interest-Group Pluralism, and Biased Pluralism) emphasizes different sets of actors as critical in determining U.S. policy outcomes, and each tradition has engendered a large empirical literature that seems to show a particular set of actors to be highly influential. Yet nearly all the empirical evidence has been essentially bivariate. Until very recently it has not been possible to test these theories against each other in a systematic, quantitative fashion. By directly pitting the predictions of ideal-type theories against each other within a single statistical model (using a unique data set that includes imperfect but useful measures of the key independent variables for nearly two thousand policy issues), we have been able to produce some striking findings. One is the nearly total failure of “median voter” and other Majoritarian Electoral Democracy theories. When the preferences of economic elites and the stands of organized interest groups are controlled for, **the preferences of the average American appear to have only a minuscule, near-zero, statistically non-significant impact upon public policy**. The failure of theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy is all the more striking because it goes against the likely effects of the limitations of our data. The preferences of ordinary citizens were measured more directly than our other independent variables, yet they are estimated to have the least effect. Nor do organized interest groups substitute for direct citizen influence, by embodying citizens’ will and ensuring that their wishes prevail in the fashion postulated by theories of Majoritarian Pluralism. Interest groups do have substantial independent impacts on policy, and a few groups (particularly labor unions) represent average citizens’ views reasonably well. **But the interest-group system as a whole does not**. Overall, net interest-group alignments are not significantly related to the preferences of average citizens. The net alignments of the most influential, business-oriented groups are negatively related to the average citizen’s wishes. So existing interest groups do not serve effectively as transmission belts for the wishes of the populace as a whole. “Potential groups” do not take up the slack, either, since average citizens’ preferences have little or no independent impact on policy after existing groups’ stands are controlled for. Furthermore, the preferences of economic elites (as measured by our proxy, the preferences of “affluent” citizens) have far more independent impact upon policy change than the preferences of average citizens do. To be sure, this does not mean that ordinary citizens always lose out; they fairly often get the policies they favor, but only because those policies happen also to be preferred by the economically-elite citizens who wield the actual influence. Of course our findings speak most directly to the “first face” of power: the ability of actors to shape policy outcomes on contested issues. But they also reflect—to some degree, at least—the “second face” of power: the ability to shape the agenda of issues that policy makers consider. The set of policy alternatives that we analyze is considerably broader than the set discussed seriously by policy makers or brought to a vote in Congress, and our alternatives are (on average) more popular among the general public than among interest groups. Thus the fate of these policies can reflect policy makers’ refusing to consider them rather than considering but rejecting them. (From our data we cannot distinguish between the two.) Our results speak less clearly to the “third face” of power: the ability of elites to shape the public’s preferences.49 We know that interest groups and policy makers themselves often devote considerable effort to shaping opinion. If they are successful, this might help explain the high correlation we find between elite and mass preferences. But it cannot have greatly inflated our estimate of average citizens’ influence on policy making, which is near zero. What do our findings say about democracy in America? They certainly constitute troubling news for advocates of “populistic” democracy, who want governments to respond primarily or exclusively to the policy preferences of their citizens. In the United States, our findings indicate, **the majority does not rule**—at least not in the causal sense of actually determining policy outcomes. When a majority of citizens disagrees with economic elites or with organized interests, they generally lose. Moreover, because of the strong status quo bias built into the U.S. political system, even when fairly large majorities of Americans favor policy change, they generally do not get it. A possible objection to populistic democracy is that average citizens are inattentive to politics and ignorant about public policy; why should we worry if their poorly informed preferences do not influence policy making? Perhaps economic elites and interest-group leaders enjoy greater policy expertise than the average citizen does. Perhaps they know better which policies will benefit everyone, and perhaps they seek the common good, rather than selfish ends, when deciding which policies to support. But we tend to doubt it. We believe instead that— collectively—ordinary citizens generally know their own values and interests pretty well, and that their expressed policy preferences are worthy of respect.50 Moreover, we are not so sure about the informational advantages of elites. Yes, detailed policy knowledge tends to rise with income and status. Surely wealthy Americans and corporate executives tend to know a lot about tax and regulatory policies that directly affect them. But how much do they know about the human impact of Social Security, Medicare, food stamps, or unemployment insurance, none of which is likely to be crucial to their own well-being? Most important, we see no reason to think that informational expertise is always accompanied by an inclination to transcend one’s own interests or a determination to work for the common good. All in all, we believe that the public is likely to be a more certain guardian of its own interests than any feasible alternative. Leaving aside the difficult issue of divergent interests and motives, we would urge that the superior wisdom of economic elites or organized interest groups should not simply be assumed. It should be put to empirical test. New empirical research will be needed to pin down precisely who knows how much, and what, about which public policies. Our findings also point toward the need to learn more about exactly which economic elites (the “merely affluent”? the top 1 percent? the top one-tenth of 1 percent?) have how much impact upon public policy, and to what ends they wield their influence. Similar questions arise about the precise extent of influence of particular sets of organized interest groups. And we need to know more about the policy preferences and the political influence of various actors not considered here, including political party activists, government officials, and other noneconomic elites. We hope that our work will encourage further exploration of these issues. Despite the seemingly strong empirical support in previous studies for theories of majoritarian democracy, our analyses suggest that majorities of the American public actually have little influence over the policies our government adopts. Americans do enjoy many features central to democratic governance, such as regular elections, freedom of speech and association, and a widespread (if still contested) franchise. But we believe that if policymaking is dominated by powerful business organizations and a small number of affluent Americans, then America’s claims to being a democratic society are seriously threatened. Clearly, when one holds constant net interest-group alignments and the preferences of affluent Americans, it makes very little difference what the general public thinks. The probability of policy change is nearly the same (around 0.3) whether a tiny minority or a large majority of average citizens favor a proposed policy change (refer to the top panel of figure 1).

## Case

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#### Aff is non-inherent – Biden XO – chilling effect too

Paavola 11/10 The downsides of 'merger ~~mania~~' in healthcare Alia Paavola - Wednesday, November 10th, 2021 https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/hospital-transactions-and-valuation/the-downsides-of-merger-mania-in-healthcare.html

"In many cases, the merged organization has paid out millions of dollars for the process of the merger, but the promised economies of scale and strategic goals of the merger don't materialize," Mr Abrams said. "Instead, we wind up with a larger organization with much more complexity because it never integrated command structures, policies or cultural expectations." In addition to challenges with integration, Mr. Abrams pointed to several other trends in the healthcare landscape contributing to providers rethinking their deals. Mr. Abrams said a key promise of many mergers announced in the last decade was to improve cost efficiency and value to patients. However, many mergers haven't resulted in meaningful change to cost or value, Mr. Abrams said. This is especially true because providers still rely heavily on fee-for-service payment methods, meaning that when patients stop coming, so does the revenue. "The promise of moving to a more accountable model that was offered as a rationale for merger mania was just that — a promise that remains mostly unfilled," Mr. Abrams said. There is also an increased threat of a legal challenge to a merger from the Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission under the Biden administration, Mr. Abrams said. The Biden administration and FTC have said they are very concerned about consolidation in many sectors, including healthcare; earlier this year, President Joe Biden signed a 72-initiative executive order targeting consolidation across economic sectors. The order encourages the Justice Department and FTC to "vigorously" enforce antitrust laws, even on past mergers that previous administrations haven't challenged. It also calls on the antitrust departments to review and revise their guidelines on hospital mergers to limit harm to patients. "The threat of a years long legal fight is convincing many people and acquirers that the risks may outweigh the benefits of a combination," Mr. Abrams said. Mr. Abrams added that traditional providers are facing bottom-line pressures as reimbursement continues to lag behind medical inflation, and the pandemic hampered finances. As a result, providers are taking a close look at the profitable and less profitable parts of the system. Many providers are also thinking about dropping some of those less profitable assets, which can explain some of the deals and partnerships unwinding, Mr. Abrams said. "In this environment, many of these institutions that have executed mergers can't help but reexamine what they've gone through and ask if the results were worth the cost," Mr. Abrams said.

#### XO limits tech, hospital, and banking mergers – threatens new and prior consolidation

Primack 7-9, business editor @ Axios (Dan, 7-9-21, “Joe Biden, trustbuster”, *Axios*, https://www.axios.com/biden-executive-order-antitrust-bigtech-e43a612c-159a-487d-99d0-e1d6c8b33bcc.html)

President Biden has decided to become the antitruster-in-chief, today signing a sweeping executive order that could limit corporate consolidation.

The big picture: Biden is explicitly asking regulators to not only block new mergers, but also to consider unwinding prior mergers that were not challenged by past administrations.

Impact on tech deals: The EO implements a "greater scrutiny of mergers, especially by dominant internet platforms, with particular attention to the acquisition of nascent competitors, serial mergers, the accumulation of data, competition by 'free' products, and the effect on user privacy."

It also asks the FTC to establish new rules on data accumulation and surveillance.

Impact on healthcare deals: The EO takes aim at hospital mergers, directing the DOJ and FTC "to review and revise their merger guidelines to ensure patients are not harmed by such mergers."

It also directs HHS to finish implementing federal legislation to limit surprise hospital billing, something that's been prevalent at private equity-owned facilities.

Impact on transportation deals: The EO argues that the airline, maritime shipping and freight railroad industries have become too consolidated, and puts new restrictions on fees and rights of way.

Impact on financial deals: The EO argues that the banking sector has become too consolidated because of mergers (resulting in closures that disproportionately impact rural areas and communities of color). It asks several agencies to "update guidelines on banking mergers to provide more robust scrutiny of mergers."

The bottom line: None of this changes actual antitrust law, to which judges remain beholden. But Biden is staking out a political philosophy that consolidation is antithetical to competition, and likely believes that the threat of regulatory action could scare off some deals from getting signed.

#### And threat of enforcement solves mergers

Sorkin et al 7-27, NYT Columnist, founder of DealBook, daily financial report published by the New York Times (Aaron Ross, Jason Karian, Sarah Kessler, Stephen Gnaedl, Michael J. De la Merced, Lauren Hirsch and Ephrat Livni, "Biden’s Antitrust Team Talks Its Way to a Win", New York Times, <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/27/business/dealbook/aon-deals-antitrust.html> accessed 7-30-21)

In the Biden administration’s first major antitrust action, the government scored a victory simply by showing a willingness to fight. Aon called off its proposed $30 billion takeover of the rival insurer Willis Towers Watson yesterday, citing delays stemming from a lawsuit brought just over a month ago by the Justice Department to block the deal, which was first announced in March last year.

“This is a victory for competition and for American businesses,” Attorney General Merrick Garland said in a statement after the deal was scrapped. The government argued that merging two of the three biggest insurance brokers would “likely lead to higher prices and less innovation.” The companies countered that the government didn’t understand their businesses.

“We reached an impasse,” Greg Case, Aon’s C.E.O., said in a statement. Aon had angled for a summer trial while the Justice Department suggested winter next year. The judge set a November date, but warned of delays; Aon decided that instead of digging in, it would pay a $1 billion termination fee to Willis and move on.

Tough talk can make big deals less appealing, former antitrust officials told DealBook. “The risk and time delays of a merger challenge often cause the parties to abandon a deal,” said Doug Melamed, a Stanford law professor and former acting chief of the Justice Department’s antitrust division. President Biden’s pledge to rein in corporate power with more aggressive antitrust enforcement efforts, backed by a team of Big Tech critics, is limited by existing laws. Aon’s move highlights how trustbusters can have their way by other means.

And even if the government doesn’t win every case it brings, the signals it sends about scrutinizing mergers more closely have been received by deal makers, who are otherwise having a very busy year. (One of the busiest on record, in fact.)